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LONGSHOREMAN-SHIPOWNER-STEVEDORE:
THE CIRCLE OF LIABILITY

Harney B. Stover, Jr.*

J.

INTRODUCTION

is universally recognized that in the past two decades the
United States Supreme Court has substantially revised the law
under which seamen, longshoremen and harbor workers (or their
survivors) may recover damages for personal injury and death.
One of the more recent and most authoritative texts in the field
of admiralty and maritime law devotes an entire chapter, 147
pages in length, to the subject of the rights of seamen and maritime workers (or their survivors) of recovery for injury and death.1
The introduction to that chapter likens the Court's rewriting of
the law in this field to a volcano and states that as long as it "continues in eruption, no charts can be guaranteed reliable" as to its
future course. It must be conceded that one of the more recent,
major and most astounding eruptions is that pertaining to the
rights of longshoremen to recover damages for personal injuries
sustained in the course of their employment aboard vessels. Since
World War II the spotlight of judicial decision and review in
maritime cases has been focused upon this one narrow field until
it has become one of the most litigious in this country. It is the
purpose of this article to review the background and history of
events within that field, set forth clearly and concisely the status
of the law and note some changes which may be forthcoming.
At the outset it would probably be helpful to define some of
the terms that will be used in the course of this article. The term
"seamen" will be used in the broad sense of those who qualify in
case of injury for maintenance and cure, that is, for receipt of a
daily living allowance and medical expenses from the ship or her
owner until a maximum cure has been effected.2 Generally the
three basic requirements for one to qualify as a seaman in order
to be entitled to maintenance and cure in case of injury are that
the vessel be in navigation, that the person have some permanent
connection with the vessel, and that the person be employed
T

I
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LAw OF ADMIRALTY ch. VI, at 248-394 (1957).
2 Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938).
1 GILMORE &: BLACK, THE
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aboard the vessel primarily to aid in navigation. 3 These requirements are very liberally construed. The "shipowner" is the person,
group of persons, firm or corporate entity in whom is vested the
title to the ship.4 The terms "longshoremen" and "stevedore"
will be used in the generic sense. The "longshoremen" are the
laborers who do the actual physical work. The "stevedore" is the
contractor or boss who employs longshoremen. 5
IL

SEAMEN'S REMEDY FOR UNSEAWORTHINESS

It has been firmly established for many years that it is the duty
of the shipowner to furnish seamen with a "seaworthy" ship. In
I 789 the United States District Court for the District of Pennsylvania, in a rather obscure decision, held that a seaman had the
right to leave his ship without any penalty, such as forfeiture of
wages or prosecution for desertion, if the shipowner failed to provide him with a seaworthy vessel. 6 In 1903 in The Osceola,7 long
considered to be one of the landmark cases in the admiralty and
maritime law field, the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Brown, summed up existing case law and stated the proposition that "the vessel and her owner are, both by English and
American Law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by
seamen in the consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship,
or a failure to supply and keep in order appliances appurtenant
to the ship." 8 As is apparent from the extended discussion in that
decision, the unseaworthiness remedy was a departure from most
of the various continental codes which limited an injured seaman's recovery in any case to maintenance and cure, perhaps following the lead of the English Merchants' Shipping Act of 1876
which permitted that type of recovery. The injured seaman, like
any other injured person, was barred from recovery at common
law for injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow servant. That
this was equally true under the maritime law had been assumed
by the courts, because of the absence of authority otherwise,9 and
3 Senko v. La Cross Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 (1957); Norton v. Warner Co.,
321 U.S. 565 (1944); South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251 (1940);
Nelson v. Greene Line· Steamers, Inc., 255 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1958); A. L. Mechling
Barge Line v. Bassett, 119 F.2d 995 (7th Cir. 1941); Hawn v. American S.S. Co., 107
F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1939).
4 DE KERCHOVE, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME DICTIONARY 724 (2d ed. 1948).
5 See id. at 472.
6 Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 Fed. Cas. 755 (No. 3930) (D. Pa. 1789).
'l 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
s Id. at 175.
9 The City of Alexandria, 17 Fed. 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1883).
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was finalized as another of the propositions in Mr. Justice Brown's
opinion. The development of the unseaworthiness remedy was
referred to by Mr. Justice Brown as a "wholesome doctrine." This
was probably because it gave seamen, who had been traditionally
protected by the courts and frequently referred to as "wards of
the admiralty," a remedy for injuries other than the relatively
meager recovery of maintenance and cure. Also, this case was
decided early in the period which finally produced legislative
abrogation of the fellow servant rule-as to railway employees in
1908 with the adoption of the Federal Railway Employees Liability Act, 10 as to seamen in 1920 with the adoption of the Jones Act,11
and as to many other workers with the adoption of state workmen's compensation acts.

III.

LONGSHOREMEN AND HARBOR WoRKERS COMPENSATION AcT

After 1903, and for the next forty-three years, the shipowner's
warranty of seaworthiness was limited to seamen. Because it was
not thought to be applicable to longshoremen and because the
common-law fellow servant doctrine made recovery of damages
by longshoremen from their stevedore-employers quite difficult
(most longshoremen's injuries being caused in whole or in part
by the negligence of co-workers), longshoremen were in most instances without an effective remedy to recover much of anything
for injuries received in the course of their employment. In 1917,
shortly after upholding the constitutionality of state workmen's
compensation acts in general,12 the United States Supreme Court
held the New York act to be unconstitutional as to a longshoreman because he was injured aboard a vessel on navigable waters
while performing maritime work under a maritime contract and
so came within the admiralty jurisdiction.13 The Court held that
application of the state compensation act would be inimical to
national uniformity in the maritime law, that the power to modify
maritime law rested in Congress, that only common-law remedies,
and not statutory compensation provisions, were covered by the
"saving to suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and that
a state compensation remedy was inconsistent with the congressional intent to encourage investment in shipping evidenced by
35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).
41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243
U.S. 210 (1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
13 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
10
11
12
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the limitation of liability acts of 1851. Later that same year Congress amended the "saving to suitors" clause to include the rights
and remedies of claimants under state workmen's compensation
laws. In 1920 that amendment was held to be unconstitutional as
an invalid delegation of federal power to the states.14 Four years
later a second similar statutory amendment was also held to be
unconstitutional.15 Because of the failure of effective legislative
action, late in 1926 the Supreme Court held that longshoremen
were "seamen" under the provisions of the Jones Act, giving them
an effective remedy for negligence against their stevedore-employers.16 Six months later Congress adopted the Longshoremen
and Harbor Workers Compensation Act17 as an exclusive remedy
for longshoremen against their stevedore-employers, nullifying the
decision bringing longshoremen under the Jones Act. The constitutionality of the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1932.18 The
purpose in adopting that statute was undoubtedly the same as
that for the adoption of most workmen's compensation acts-to
provide employees with a remedy which is both expeditious and
independent of proof of fault and to assure employers of a liability
which is limited and determinate.19
The Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation Act
provides for compensation payments for disability or death resulting from injuries arising out of and in the course of employment,20 provided that the death or disability results from an injury
occurring on the navigable waters of the United States, including
any dry dock, and that recovery may not validly be provided by
state law.21 A person injured while working on an uncompleted
vessel, then launched and afloat in navigable waters, but still
under construction, is covered by the act, and acceptance of compensation payments in such a case under a state compensation act
does not constitute an election of the remedy under state law so as
to preclude recovery under the federal act, the payments under
the state act being credited to those due under the federal provi14
15

16
11

18
19
20
21

Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1958).
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 159 (1932).
64 Stat. 1271 (1950), 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (1958).
44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903 (1958).
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sions.22 Absolute liability of the employer irrespective of fault is
provided for, 23 and recovery schedules for various degrees of disability24 and for death25 prescribe amounts of awards based upon
the worker's wage rate. 26 Compensation is not payable under the
act to the master or members of the crew of any vessel, to any
persons engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any
vessel under eighteen tons net, to an officer or employee of the
United States Government or any agency thereof or any state or
foreign government or any political subdivision thereof, or to
any person injured or killed solely by reason of his intoxication
or his willful intent to injure or kill himself or another. 27 As to
the last restriction, there is a presumption against the presence of
intoxication or willful intent to injure or kill in the absence of
convincing evidence to the contrary,28 and horseplay has been
held not to bar recovery under the act.29 Although the injured
worker's remedy under the act is exclusive as against his stevedoreemployer, the employer who has not complied with the act's requirements for securing payments may be subjected to an action
for damages, either at law or in admiralty, and in such action the
defenses of fellow servant, contributory negligence and assumption of risk are abolished. 30 Penalties are also established for failure
on the part of both employer31 and employees,32 as well as shipmrners,33 to comply with provisions of the act.
JV.

UNSEAWORTHINESS REMEDY EXTENDED TO LONGSHOREMEN

For a period of nineteen years following the passage of the
Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, the
courts were content for longshoremen to live exclusively within
its terms in the case of injuries received or death incurred aboard
a ship. Then in 1946 the Supreme Court for the first time held
Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 904 (1958).
2t 44 Stat. 1427 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 908 (1958).
25 44 Stat. 1429 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 909 (1958).
26 44 Stat. 1431 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 910 (1958).
21 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903 (1958).
2s 44 Stat. 1436 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 920 (1958).
20 General Acc. Fire&: Life Assur. Corp. v. Crowell, 76 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1935).
30 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1958).
31 44 Stat. 1442 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 938 (1958) (for failure to secure payments).
32 44 Stat. 1439 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 931 (1958) (for misrepresentations for purpose of
obtaining benefits under tbe act).
33 44 Stat. 1442 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 937 (1958) (for failure to demand certificate of
compliance from stevedore).
22

23
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that a longshoreman could bring suit against a shipowner, whether
or not the shipowner was negligent, for damages incurred by reason of the unseaworthiness of the vessel aboard which he was
injured, in addition to receiving compensation from his stevedoreemployer under the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation Act. 34 The shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness was
extended to longshoremen working aboard the vessel on the basis
that, since they were then doing work which was traditionally
done by seamen, they should receive the same benefits as did
seamen. As could be expected, that decision proved to be the gateway to a new field of litigation in the maritime law. In 1953 the
doctrine was extended to other types of harbor workers, such as
the carpenter-employee of a repairman. 35 At the same time the
Supreme Court also recognized that longshoremen and harbor
workers have the right of business invitees aboard a ship to recover
damages for operating negligence, in addition to their newlyfound right of recovery for injuries resulting from the unseaworthiness of the ship. 36 Thus the longshoreman was placed on
a par with the seaman, having a right to recover damages from the
shipowner for negligence, similar to that which the seaman enjoyed under the Jones Act, as well as the seaman's ancient maritime remedy to recovery damages for the unseaworthiness of the
vessel. In addition the longshoreman also retained an absolute
right to compensation from his stevedore-employer under the
Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation Act. Though
there was originally a hint otherwise, it is now apparently clear
that the seaworthiness warranty does not extend to the longshoreman's stevedore-employer. 37
V.

DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF UNSEAWORTHINESS

The seaman's right to a seaworthy vessel having been accorded
to longshoremen, an examination of the meaning of the term
"unseaworthiness" seems necessary. Over the years this concept
has become almost all-inclusive. It has come to mean much more
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). It has been held that the
seaworthiness warranty does not extend to a longshoreman working on the dock at a
job not traditionally done by seamen. Partenweederei, MS Belgrano v. Weigel, 299 F.2d
897 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 830 (1962).
36 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, supra note 35, at 413, 415.
37 Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International, 170 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal. 1959),
aff'd, 274 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960).
34

35
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than simply a ship's being holed so as to cause her to sink, and
includes within its scope structural defects and defective machinery, appliances, furnishings, tackle and equipment. Unseaworthiness claims have been said to fall into two categories: one, where
the shipowner, having knowledge, actual or constructive, that
certain activity will occur, has the absolute duty of furnishing
equipment and a place aboard ship for its use so that the activity
can be conducted and accomplished in reasonable safety; the other,
where the equipment actually supplied for doing the work proves
incapable of performing its function in the manner for which it
was designed. 38 It is now firmly established that a vessel's unseaworthiness may arise from any number of individual circumstances, including among others: defective gear, appurtenances
in disrepair, unfit crew, improper manner of loading cargo and
improper stowage of cargo. 39 It must be made quite clear, however, that mere negligent use of seaworthy equipment does not,
in and of itself, make a vessel unseaworthy. 4° Control of the work
area is irrelevant to liability for unseaworthiness. 41 A ship is unseaworthy even if the defective equipment is brought aboard the
ship by a stevedore for its own use,42 but there is growing authority
that such may not be the case where the defective equipment is
that of the stevedore and does not become an "integral part of the
ship." 43 Whether or not equipment is so defective as to render
a ship unseaworthy is a question of fact for the jury. 44 Interpretation of the term has sometimes been carried to extreme
lengths, and such is no more apparent than in a recent decision
of the Supreme Court where it was held to be a jury question
whether a wrench, concerning which there was testimony from
which it might be inferred that there was play in its jaw so as to
permit it to slip on a nut, was such a defective appliance as to
38 Meslc v. Kea S.S. Corp., 260 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966
(1959). An excellent and exhaustive discussion of the term "unseaworthiness" is also
presented by Judge Herlands in Di Salvo v. Cunard S.S. Co., 171 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
so Morales v. City of Galveston, 370 U.S. 165 (1962).
40 Arena v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 279 F.2d 186 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 895
(1960); Seitz v. M.V. Captantonis, 203 F. Supp. 723 (D. Ore. 1962).
41 Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
42 Ibid. Rogers v. United States Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954); Considine v. Black Diamond S.S. Co., 163 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mass. 1958).
43 Sherbin v. Embiricos, 200 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. La. 1962); McKnight v. N. M. Paterson &: Sons, Ltd., 181 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ohio), afj'd, 286 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1960).
44 Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325 (1960); Knox v. United States
Lines Co., 294 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1961).
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render a ship unseaworthy. 45 A ship is not regarded as unseaworthy
because of a latent defect in its cargo,46 but the desirability of this
attitude is surely to be questioned in the future.
A shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is absolute,
continuing and non-delegable, and the shipowner is not absolved
from this obligation by the exercise of due diligence. 47 Notice to
the master or shipowner and actual or constructive knowledge
of the unseaworthy condition are no longer necessary, so that liability attaches for transitory or temporary unseaworthiness, involving situations such as water, soap, food, oil, grease, slime,
etc., on the deck, as well as for a permanent condition.48 It has
been authoritatively stated that the shipowner's duty is not to
provide an "accident-free ship," but is a duty "only to furnish a
vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use"; 411
that "the standard is not perfection, but reasonable fitness; not a
ship that will weather every conceivable storm or withstand every
imaginable peril of the sea, but of a vessel reasonably suitable for
her intended service." 50 The meaning of this phraseology, ostensibly introducing some concept of reasonableness into the shipowner's absolute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel, will undoubtedly
be the subject of much litigation for many years.
The shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness does not attach to
a "dead ship" not in navigation, such as a grain storage vessel. 151
In the case of a bareboat or demise charter, the charterer or
demisee stands in the place of the shipowner, and the shipowner
is not liable for unseaworthiness of the vessel caused by the
Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., supra note 44.
Bell v. Nihonkai Kisen, K.K., 204 F. Supp. 230 (D. Ore. 1962).
47 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960); Michalic v. Cleveland Tank•
ers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325 (1960); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
48 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., supra note 47.
49 Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955). (Emphasis added.)
50 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960). (Emphasis added.) This
case involved an injury to a crew member aboard a fishing vessel who slipped, fell and
was injured when, in accordance with recognized custom, he stepped onto the ship's
rail in order to reach a ladder attached to the pier to go ashore. The rail had become
slippery from spawn and slime which had accumulated there during the unloading of
the vessel's catch of fish and fish spawn. The jury had found against the injured sea•
man on the question of unseaworthiness, but the district judge had instructed the jury
that constructive notice was necessary in order to support liability for unseaworthiness.
The Supreme Court held such to be unnecessary, and reversed and remanded for a
new trial on the issue of unseaworthiness. In doing so, the Court acknowledged the
absoluteness of the shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy vessel, but also made the
somewhat ambignous and contrary statement quoted above.
51 Roper v. United States, 368 U.S. 20 (1961).
45

46

1963]

LIABILITY OF STEVEDORES

547

charterer or demisee.52 A split of authority exists as to wheth~r
the vessel herself is liable therefor and can be made a party to
an action along with the charterer or demisee. 53
Negligent use of an otherwise seaworthy appliance, which is
thereby made "unseaworthy" at the very moment of injury, raises
no unseaworthiness question, and the shipowner is not liable
therefor. 54 Though this is a relatively simple proposition, its
interpretation is most difficult and can best be explained by illustration. In one case a situation was considered in which a loading
board tipped and spilled rolls of paper into the hold of a vessel,
injuring a longshoreman. Fellow longshoremen had loaded the
board improperly. The court held that a stevedore's negligent use
of proper equipment for bringing freight aboard did not make the
vessel unseaworthy. It was specifically stated that the court did
"not believe that unseaworthiness is to be equated with mere
negligent conduct." 55 Another situation involved a longshoreman
who was injured when a winch, operated by a fellow longshoreman who failed to insert a locking pin, fell out of gear and became free-wheeling, causing a hatch section which had been raised
to drop and strike him on the foot. In that instance the court held
that the longshoreman's injury was incurred through the negligent
use of a seaworthy appliance at the very moment of injury, so that
the vessel, upon the termination of the negligence, was in fact seaworthy, and the injured longshoreman had no right of recovery
against the shipowner. 56 Recent decisions have wrestled with this
theory in the light of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court
upholding the attachment of liability in cases of transitory or
temporary unseaworthiness, whether or not there was actual or
constructive notice of the unseaworthy condition. In appropriate
instances the courts have absolved the shipowner of the charge of
unseaworthiness, affirming a jury verdict or decision of the trial
52 Reed v. S.S. Yaka, 302 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1962); Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d
919 (2d Cir. 1956).
53 Accord, Grillea v. United States, supra note 52. Contra, Reed v. S.S. Yaka, supra
note 52; Pichirilo v. Guzman, 290 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1961), rev'd, 369 U.S. 698 (1962),
on the ground that the charter was not a demise.
54 This was established by Judge Learned Hand in Grillea v. United States, 232
F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956), but its validity seemed somewhat questionable for awhile because of Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960), which did away with
the defense of transitory unseaworthiness.
!iii Arena v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 279 F.2d 186 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 895
(1960).
56 Billed v. United States, 298 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1960). See also Sullivan v. United
States, 198 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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court holding the ship to have been seaworthy and the accident
to have resulted directly and solely from the negligence of the
stevedore through the actions of fellow longshoremen. 117
VI.

INDEMNIFICATION OF SHIPOWNER BY STEVEDORE

A. History

For a time following the initial decision which extended the
shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness to longshoremen, it became
apparent that the longshoreman who received an injury in the
course of his employment aboard a ship on navigable waters was
in an enviable position, if an injured man can be so regarded.
Without the burden of any proof of negligence, he could recover
compensation under the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers
Compensation Act from his stevedore-employer. At the same time
he was entitled to recover damages for either negligence or unseaworthiness from the shipowner and, in the light of the broad
judicial interpretation of the meaning of the term "unseaworthiness," the injured longshoreman's recovery of damages in addition
to compensation was virtually assured. On the other hand, the
shipowner's position was quite unenviable. His was an almost intolerable burden, and this became no more apparent than in 1952
in a case in which a jury had found a shipowner to be twenty-five
percent responsible and a stevedore-employer to be seventy-five
percent responsible for a longshoreman's injuries, and the Supreme Court denied the shipowner indemnification from the
stevedore because of the ancient prohibition against contribution
between joint tortfeasors, stating that any change in the commonlaw rule was a matter of legislative concern.58 Two years later the
Supreme Court reaffirmed that decision.59 In effect this meant
that an injured longshoreman or harbor worker could recover
damages from a shipowner for unseaworthiness, and the shipowner
57 Puddu v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 840 (1962); Nuzzo v. Rederi A/S Wallenco, 304 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1962); Neal v.
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 306 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1962); Rawson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 304
F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962); Pinto v. States Marine Corp., 296 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961); Knox
v. United States Lines Co., 201 F. Supp. 131 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
58 Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952). The
district court had ignored the jury verdict and entered judgment to the effect that
each joint tortfeasor was to pay one-half of the damages. The court of appeals had
then upheld the shipowner's right of contribution from the stevedore-employer, but
stated that it could not exceed that which the injured longshoreman might have re•
covered from his employer directly under the Longshoremen and Harbor ·workers Compensation Act.
59 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
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had no right to indemnification from the stevedore-employer of
the injured man, even though the unseaworthiness resulting in the
recovery was caused solely by the negligence of the stevedoreemployer. The ultimate burden then rested with the shipowner,
even when not in fact negligent or responsible in any respect, or
when less responsible than the stevedore, probably on the basis
that the shipowner could more practicably absorb such a prospective financial burden than could the stevedore who was already
subject to an absolute statutory liability under the Longshoremen
and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (and therefore should
be entitled to limit the amount of his liability). This result obviously worked an injustice upon shipowners, and lower courts
immediately set about by-passing the ancient common-law rule
against contribution between joint tortfeasors which the Supreme
Court had so vigorously applied to maritime torts. 60
B. Stevedore's Warranty of Workmanlike Service

I. Generally
The final breakthrough came in 1956 when the Supreme Court
considered "two questions as to the liability of a stevedoring contractor to reimburse a shipowner for damages paid by the latter
to one of the contractor's longshoremen on account of injuries
received by him in the course of his employment on shipboard":
first, whether the shipowner was precluded from asserting such
liability by the terms of the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers
Compensation Act and, second, whether such liability existed in
the absence of an express indemnification agreement between the
stevedore-employer and the shipowner. 61 The first question was
answered in the negative, and the second in the affirmative. The
Supreme Court stated that a stevedoring contract contains an implied "warranty of workmanlike service that is comparable to a
manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of its manufactured
product," and held that a stevedore-contractor has the implied
contractual obligation to the shipowner to perform the stevedoring operation in a proper, competent and workmanlike manner
with reasonable safety and to discharge foreseeable damages resulting to the shipowner from the stevedore's improper perform60 See Palazzolo v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 211 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1954); Brown v.
American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 211 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1954); Crawford v. Pope &: Talbot,
Inc., 206 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1953).
61 Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
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ance. With this contractual fiction, the Court succeeded in getting
around the ever-present bar of the rule against contribution between joint tortfeasors and thus effectively shifted the burden
from the innocent shipowner to the negligent stevedore-employer
whose liability had supposedly been limited by virtue of the
Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation Act.

2. Scope
The initial decision of the Supreme Court specifically referred
to the proper and safe stowage of cargo. 62 Since then the stevedore's
warranty of workmanlike service has been expanded and extended
almost without limit. It has been held that the stevedore also warrants to the shipowner that the longshoremen furnished for the job
are "reasonably fit to perform their functions." 63 The stevedore's
duty to the shipowner is contractual and may be based upon
principles other than the shipo-wner's failure to perform the nondelegable duty to a longshoreman to provide him with a seaworthy
vessel.64 The stevedore's contractual obligation to perform in a
competent and workmanlike manner relates not only to the handling and stowage of cargo, but also to the use of equipment incidental thereto. 65 Theories of "active" or "passive" and "primary"
or "secondary" negligence do not apply to the field of contractual
indemnity, and the shipowner-indemnitee may recover, although
negligent in some respects, provided the shipowner is free from
"conduct sufficient to preclude recovery." 60 Where negligence of
the stevedore, through its employees, causes unseaworthiness of
the vessel and results in injury to one of its longshoremen-employees, such also amounts to a breach of the contractual warranty of
workmanlike service, and the shipowner is entitled to indemnification from the stevedore. 67 It is not necessary that there be a direct
Ibid.
Trenkle v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 179 F. Supp. 795 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
64 Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958). However,
in DeGioia v. United States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962), the Second Circuit
stated that a stevedore's obligation to indemnify the shipowner in Iongshoremen's per•
sonal injury actions is not literally an action ex contractu, and that "the primary
source of the shipowner's right to indemnity, as a practical matter, is his nondelegable
duty to provide a seaworthy ship . . . .'' Id. at 425.
65 Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., supra note 64.
66 Ibid.
67 Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959). This case involved
a longshoreman who was injured aboard a vessel when a topping lift broke due to
abnormal strains placed on the ship's gear and a winch circuit breaker improperly
set at six tons, when the winch could safely lift only three tons. Both the placement
of the abnormal strains and the improper setting of the winch circuit breaker were
62

63
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contractual relationship between the shipowner and the stevedore
for the application of the warranty of work.manlike service, and it
applies even though the stevedoring contract has been entered
into with the stevedore by the ship's charterer68 or even by the
cargo's consignee. 611 In effect, if the stevedoring contract is entered
into by someone other than the shipowner, the shipowner is considered a third-party beneficiary thereof.

3. Necessity for Causal Connection
It is noteworthy, however, that if the stevedore did not create
the unseaworthy condition which causes the injury to the longshoreman, had nothing to do with bringing it into play, and had
no notice of it, there is authority that the stevedore should not be
liable for indemnification to the shipowner. In one case, where a
longshoreman was injured when he slipped on a greasy rung of
a ladder descending from the deckhouse roof, the longshoreman recovered from the shipowner because of the transitory unseaworthiness of the vessel; but the shipowner was denied indemnification
from the stevedore on the grounds that the stevedore had no notice
of the greasy condition and no proof was introduced at the trial
connecting the placing of the grease to the negligence of the
stevedore's employees.70 In another case a longshoreman was injured when some hatch boards piled on loose dunnage slipped out
from under him. The vessel was held to be unseaworthy and her
owner negligent, because the dunnage and hatch boards were piled
in an unsafe, insecure and haphazard manner; but indemnification
of the shipowner by the longshoreman's stevedore-employer was
denied, even though the stevedore had knowledge of the condition,
because the stevedore had not created the unseaworthy condition
and it was present in an area over which the stevedore did not
exercise exclusive control.71 In effect, what has been held in these
made by longshoremen-employees of the stevedore. The district court entered judgment
against the shipowner with indemnity over against the stevedore. This judgment was
reversed by the court of appeals on the ground that the circuit breaker was not unseaworthy and that the sole cause of the injury was the negligence of the stevedore.
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and reinstated the judgment
of the district court.
68 Ibid.
69 Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan &: McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960). See also
Cooper v. D/S A/S Progress, 188 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1960), where an intenllediate
time charter intervening between charterer and stevedore was held not to affect the
stevedore's contractual obligation to unload in a safe and workmanlike manner.
70 Calderola v. Cunard S.S. Co., 279 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1960). See also Massaro v.
United States Lines Co., 1962 Am. Mar. Cas. 2168 (3d Cir. 1962).
71 Marshall v. S.S. Lake Allin, 1960 Am. Mar. Cas. 2024 (D. Ore. 1960). See also
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cases is that, even though the stevedore's breach of its warranty
of workmanlike service is contractual in nature, there must be
some causal connection between it and the accident resulting in
the longshoreman's injuries. There is authority, however, indicating that the stevedore should suspend operations on its own initiative to avoid injury or damages upon realizing that it would be
unsafe to proceed.72 If the shipowner settles the longshoreman's
claim for damages due to unseaworthiness independently and then
seeks indemnity from the stevedore-employer for breach of the
warranty of workmanlike service, there is authority indicating that
the shipowner need not establish actual liability to the longshoreman but only potential liability and the making of a reasonable
settlement.73 However, such an approach has been subjected to
criticism. 74
C. Acts of Shipowner Which Do Not Preclude Indemnification
Barring the situation which clearly involves the negligent
use of otherwise seaworthy equipment by employees of the stevedore, in almost every situation involving a longshoreman who is
seeking to recover damages from a shipowner for injuries received
because of the shipowner's negligence or the unseaworthiness of
his vessel and a shipowner who is in turn seeking indemnification
from the stevedore-employer of the injured longshoreman, the
primary question becomes that of what acts on the part of the
shipowner-indemnitee will preclude recovery from the stevedoreindemnitor. Of course, this presupposes some breach on the part
of the stevedore-employer of its warranty of workmanlike service.
As a general rule, negligent acts on the part of the shipownerindemnitee, usually through the instrumentality of the ship's
crew, have been held not to preclude recovery from the stevedoreTrenkle v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 179 F. Supp. 795 (S.D. Cal. 1960),
holding that there must be some act or omission on the part of the stevedore. To
the same effect, but by very brief reference, is Mesle v. Kea S.S. Co., 260 F.2d 747 (3d
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966 (1959).
72 United States v. Arrow Stevedoring Co., 175 F.2d 329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 904 (1949); Cassone v. Venezuelan Line, 1962 Am. Mar. Cas. 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
Nordeutsher Lloyd, Brennan v. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co., 195 F. Supp. 680 (D. Ore.
1961); Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International, 170 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal. 1959),
afj'd, 274 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960).
73 Rederi A/B Dalen v. Maher, 303 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1962); California Stevedore
&: Ballast Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 291 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1961); Caswell v. K.N.S.M.,
N.V., 205 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Te."<. 1962).
74 American Export Lines, Inc. v. Atlantic &: Gulf Stevedores, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 316
(E.D. Va. 1962).
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indemnitor. Failure to inspect, and to discover and correct a stevedore's breach of warranty of workmanlike service is not a bar to recovery from the stevedore by the shipowner. Thus failure to inspect, discover and correct improper stowage of cargo aboard the
vessel,715 and failure to discover and correct the improper use of
equipment incidental to the handling and stowage of cargo have
been held not to be conduct sufficient to preclude the shipowner's
right to recover over against the stevedore. 76 A shipowner's supplying of defective equipment to a stevedore is generally held not to
be such an act as to preclude indemnification. The supplying of a
defective winch or a winch with a defective component part has
been held not to preclude indemnification. 77 A shipowner's maintaining inadequate lighting in a hold78 or providing unsafe lighting, as in the case of an unseized light,79 do not bar recovery.
Defective topping lift gear,80 an unbolted ladder, 81 use of slippery
dunnage as flooring8 2 and unsecured hatch boards, 83 though provided by the shipowner, are not such as to prevent indemnification. Oil on the deck of a ship from a leaking winch box, though
held to have made the vessel unseaworthy, was not such as to preclude recovery over by the shipowner from the stevedore-employer
of a longshoreman who slipped and fell on the oily slick. 84 Improper securing of a ship for loading or unloading by the ship's
crew has been held not to preclude indemnification. 85 A shipowner's providing a litter-strewn area in which longshoremen are to
work does not bar indemnification, the duty being upon the stevedore to clear the work area before commencing to load or discharge cargo. 86
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
77 Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); American Export
Lines, Inc. v. Revel, 266 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1959); Drago v. A/S Inger, 194 F. Supp. 398
(E.D.N.Y. 1961).
78 Schiavone Terminal, Inc. v. Bozzo, 289 F.2d 735 (1st Cir. 1961).
79 Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 266 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1959).
so Cook v. The M/V Wasaborg, 189 F. Supp. 464 (D. Ore. 1960); Weigel v. The M/V
Belgrano, 188 F. Supp. 605 (D. Ore. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 299 F.2d 897, afj'd
on rehearing, 302 F.2d 730 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 830 (1962).
81 Smith v. Jugoslavenska, 278 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1960).
82 Wyborski v. Bristol City Line of S. Ss., Ltd., 191 F. Supp. 884 (D. Md. 1961).
83 Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International, 170 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal.), afj'd,
274 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960).
84 Drago v. A/S Inger, 194 F. Supp. 438 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Santomarco v. United
States, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. 1808 (E.D.N.Y. 1959), afj'd, 277 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 823 (1960).
85 Lamazza v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
86 DeGioia v. United States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962).
715

76
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One of the most publicized and closely followed cases in this
particular phase of maritime law development resulted in the
recent decision of the Supreme Court in Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd. 81 Leighton Beard was a longshoreman employed by Atlantic and Gulf Stevedores, Inc. at
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Atlantic performed stevedoring services for the owners of the steamship "City of Calcutta," which consisted of discharging bales of burlap from the steamer. Beard was
one of the longshoremen engaged in helping to discharge the
cargo. The bales had been loaded in India, were banded with oneinch bands which were part of the cargo, and were stowed in tiers.
They were discharged from the vessel by use of the bale-hook
method. By this method a winch was used with a ring to which six
equal-length ropes were attached with a hook on the end of each
rope. Two hooks were used on each bale so that three bales were
raised with each lifting operation. Longshoremen in the hold of
the vessel, including Beard, would attach the hooks to the bales,
signal the winch operator to pull the bales from their stow to a
position under the open hatch, and then the bales would be raised
vertically, swung out from the ship .ind lowered to the dock.
During the unloading operation, two bands on one of the bales
parted, and the bale fell, injuring Beard. Atlantic had no part
in the loading or stowage of this particular cargo aboard the ship.
Beard brought a civil action, founded upon diversity of citizenship, against the shipowner, alleging unseaworthiness and negligence. The shipowner joined the stevedore-employer as a thirdparty defendant, alleging negligence in discharging the cargo and
in using a dangerous and improper method to do so, and seeking
indemnification in the event that the shipowner was held liable
to Beard. The case was tried to a jury which found, upon special
interrogatories, that both the unseaworthiness of the vessel and
the negligence of the shipowner were substantial factors in causing
Beard's injuries and that there was no failure of contractual obligation on the part of the stevedore. The district court entered judgment in favor of Beard against the shipowner and in favor of the
stevedore on the shipowner's indemnification claim. The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that, since the warranty of
workmanlike service extends to the handling of cargo as well as
to the use of equipment incidental to cargo handling, the steve87

369 U.S. 355, rehearing denied, 369 U.S. 882 (1962).
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dore was liable, as a matter of law, to the shipowner. 88 The court
stated that if it was negligent on the shipowner's part to permit
Beard to work in an unsafe place, it was equally negligent for the
stevedore to handle the cargo which it charged created an unsafe
place to work. Deeming that it was unnecessary "to consider the
issue of unseaworthiness," the court of appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of Beard against the shipowner on the issue of
negligence, but reversed the judgment in favor of the stevedore,
thereby permitting indemnification.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Third Circuit as between the shipowner and the stevedore, and ruled
against indemnification. However, careful examination of both
the decision of the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit's decision reveals that the Supreme Court did not hold that knowledge
of and failure to warn the stevedore in regard to improper
stowage or an improper unloading method will preclude the shipowner's right of indemnification. Instead, the Court neatly sidestepped that basic and practical question, as to which the stevedoring industry was earnestly seeking an authoritative decision,
and decided the case on a different ground. Essentially, the Court
held that since the seventh amendment to the Constitution of the
United States provides that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law," the requirements of
the seventh amendment were applicable to the case at bar, even
though a stevedoring contract is a maritime contract. The applicability of the seventh amendment was predicated upon the fact that
the case involved a suit in personam at law with the right of trial
by jury. The Court held that, although the jury could have found
the shipowner negligent for one or both of the reasons that the
use of the bale-hook method in the discharge of the bales was
negligent and that the injured longshoreman was not afforded
a safe place to work, it could also have found the shipowner
liable on a third ground, that the steel bands around the bale
were defective, "a matter which was covered by the charge to the
jury on the issue of unseaworthiness, and properly so." The
Court then went on the say that if such was the jury's view of the
facts, then the stevedore would not be liable under any warranty
of workmanlike service; that where there is a view of the facts
88

Beard v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 289 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1961).
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of the case which makes the jury's special verdict legally consistent,
it must be resolved in that manner; and that, therefore, the jury's
answers to the special interrogatories should be permitted to stand
and were not properly the subject of re-examination and reversal
by the court of appeals.
Two lessons are to be learned from the Atlantic & Gulf
Stevedores case. First, negligence in the form of knowledge of
the shipowner and failure by it to warn the stevedore in regard
to improper stowage of cargo or improper unloading methods
being used by the stevedore will not preclude the shipowner's
right of indemnification from the stevedore. The reversal by the
Supreme Court was not on this ground, and there was authority
prior to the Third Circuit's decision supporting that proposition.89
Second, interrogatories for the special verdict of a jury in regard to
the indemnification issue must be artfully worded so as to result in
clear revelation of the exact basis of the jury's decision, either in
favor of or against indemnification.

Acts of Shipowners Which Do Preclude Indemnification
I. Failure of Shipowner To Correct or Warn
of Known Latent Defect
Thus far, the only activity of the shipowner-indemnitee which
has been authoritatively held to preclude recovery from the stevedore-indemnitor has been the failure of the shipowner to correct or warn the stevedore of a latent, or hidden, dangerous defect
or condition known to the shipowner.90 In a situation where a
longshoreman fell from atop crates on board a lighter to a pier
below when one of the crate boards broke, it was held that the
injury was not caused by any improper stowage, but was caused
by the defective board, and that "the latent defect in the board
on top of the crate was an intervening cause which broke any causal
chain that might otherwise have existed," and so precluded inD.

89 W. J. Jones &: Sons, Inc. v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 284 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1960),
affirming 163 F. Supp. 463 (D. Ore. 1959); Curtis v. A. Garcia y Cia, 272 F.2d 235 (3d
Cir. 1959). See also Nordeutscher Lloyd, Brennan v. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co., 195
F. Supp. 680 (D. Ore. 1961); Fisher v. United States Lines Co., 198 F. Supp. 815 (E.D.
Pa. 1961).
90 Although such was not actually involved, the Supreme Court made specific reference to situations involving known latent defects in Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema
Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958). In Nuzzo v. Rederi A/S Wallenco, 304 F.2d 506
(2d Cir. 1962), the Second Circuit, in a two-to-one decision, reversed the trial court
specifically on the ground that the condition for which the ship had been found unseaworthy was a patent condition and not a latent defect or contrary to the usual and
customary standards.
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demnification. 91 Likewise, it has been held that the implied warranty of workmanlike service of the stevedore does not place upon
him the duty to discover defects in apparatus furnished by the
vessel not obvious upon a cursory inspection, such as a rotten
rope 92 or a defective rung in a Jacob's ladder.93 As indicated previously, this rationale has not as yet been judicially extended to
include a latent defect in the ship's cargo.94

2. Breach of Express Warranty by Shipowner
One of the most interesting and more recent decisions in this
entire field is Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet lnternational. 95
That case involved a situation in which a queen beam belonging in
the number one main deck hatch of the motorship "Castleville" was
misplaced under the hatch boards of the forward section of number one 'tweendeck hatch, so that the 'tweendeck hatch boards
wobbled, seesawed and were generally insecure. A longshoreman
fell through the hatch into the hold when walking on the insecure
hatch boards. Although the shipowner was held liable for damages
to the injured longshoreman since the vessel was deemed unseaworthy because of the misplaced queen beam and unsecured hatch
boards, it was also held entitled to indemnification from the stevedore-employer since the stevedore was found to have breached
its contractual obligation to perform in a workmanlike manner
with reasonable safety by permitting its men to work on the
known dangerous hatch boards. The decision was affirmed by the
court of appeals.96 Though the case was actually not decided on
this point, the district court in its opinion seemed to indicate
that breach by the shipowner of a written warranty in a stevedoring contract might relieve the stevedore of its implied obligation to indemnify the vessel for breach of its warranty of workmanlike service, if the stevedore was unaware of the breach of
warranty on the part of the shipowner. But the court went on to
state that if the stevedore knew of the breach and nonetheless
willingly proceeded with the work despite the known dangerous
01 Reddick v. McAllister Lighterage Line, Inc., 258 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1958). To
the same effect in a similar situation, see Pena v. A/S Dovrefjell, 176 F. Supp. 677
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
02 Ignatyuk v. Tramp Chartering Co., 250 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1957).
OS Sciarrillo v. S.S. Fred Christiansen, 206 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
o~ Sec note 46 supra.
llll 170 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
06 Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International, 274 F.2d 875
(9th Cir. 1960).
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condition, such would be a waiver by the stevedore of the shipowner's breach of warranty.97 On appeal the Ninth Circuit specifically indicated that it need not consider the question of waiver,
but did state that the evidence fully supported the findings of
waiver, if it were necessary. In a subsequent case, another district
court in the same circuit so interpreted the reasoning of the trial
court in the first case, but based its holding on a different grpund
and specifically stated that it made no decision as to whether a
breach of written warranty by the shipowner would relieve the
stevedore.98 In an even later decision in another circuit it was
held that a written indemnification provision, whereby the stevedore agreed to indemnify the shipowner, meant that when both
the shipowner and stevedore were negligent, the stevedore was to
indemnify the shipowner.99 From the opposite point of view, then,
it should follow that if there is a written indemnification provision
whereby the shipowner agrees to indemnify the stevedore and both
are negligent, the shipowner should idemnify the stevedore. This
has not as yet been decided, but there is some authority indicating
that a stevedore may limit its liability for indemnification by express stipulation.100

E. Law Applicable to Indemnification
An express indemnity clause in a contract between a stevedore and a shipowner is governed by federal law,101 and recovery
under implied warranties is precluded where express contractual
warranties cover the field. 102 However, as a practical matter, where
there are express contractual warranties present, there is no need
to employ the fiction of an implied warranty. Because the Supreme
Court has apparently assumed the federal character of the law to
be applied to maritime service contracts in its leading decisions,
97

Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International, 170 F. Supp. 601, 611 (S.D. Cal.

1959).
98 Cook v. M/V Wasaborg, 189
99 See note 85 supra.
100 In DeGioia v. United States

F. Supp. 464 (D. Ore. 1960).

Lines, 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962), the court made
this bald statement, but the citation given as the basis therefor was D'Agosta v. Royal
Netherlands S.S. Co., 301 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1962), which held that recovery under an
implied warranty is precluded where an express warranty covers the situation.
It is now clear, however, that a shipowner's material breach of a written stevedoring
contract will bar the shipowner's right to indemnification from the stevedore under an
express indemnification provision in the contract. Pettus v. Grace Line, Inc., ll05 F.2d
151 (2d Cir. 1962).
101 A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Commercial Stevedoring Co., 256 F.2d
227 (2d Cir. 1958).
102 D'Agosta v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 301 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1960).
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it has been held that the federal maritime law also governs in
situations involving an implied warranty of workmanlike service
by the stevedore to the shipowner. 103 Even in a state court the
federal substantive law is applicable, but it has been held that,
subject to the court's discretion, the state procedural law will be
applied unless it so influences the parties' substantive rights as
to require the adoption of the federal practice as well as substantive law. 104 In Pennsylvania this resulted in application of the
substantive maritime law as to the rights of the injured longshoreman and the shipowner, but prevented impleader of the
stevedore because of a state court principle against determination
of a contractual right to indemnification in an action for damages
for personal injury. 105 This line of reasoning was subsequently
rejected and impleader was permitted by one of the federal courts
in that same jurisdiction.106 Federal maritime law also prohibits
an action in admiralty against a shipowner by the wife of an injured or deceased longshoreman for loss of consortium.107
\

F. Recovery of Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses
The great weight of authority provides that the shipownerindemnitee may recover attorney fees and expenses of litigation
from the stevedore-indemnitor under either an express or an
implied indemnity relationship. 108 One case held this to be limited
to provisions of express indemnification or to the situation in
103 Royal Netherlands S.S. Co. v. Strachan Shipping Co., 301 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1962):
Booth S.S. Co. v. Meier 8c Oelhaf Co., 262 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1958).
lOi Lloyd v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 402 Pa. 484, 167 A.2d 689 (1960).
1011 Ibid.
106 Scioli v. Dammers 8c Van Der Heide's Shipping 8c Trading Co., 28 F.R.D. 396
(E.D. Pa. 1961). Contra, West Afr. Nav., Ltd. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 191 F. Supp.
131 (E.D. Pa. 1961), decided three months earlier. In Cooper v. D/S A/S Progress, 188
F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Pa. 1960), it was held that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 14 and
42(a) clearly permit trial together of the principal action and the third party action
for indemnification.
101 Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 207 F. Supp. 236 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); Pruitt
v. M.S. Rigoletto, 1962 Am. Mar. Cas. 1997 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
108 Rederi A/B Dalen v. Maher, 303 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1962); DeGioia v. United
States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962); A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v.
Commercial Stevedoring Co., 256 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1958); Shannon v. United States,
235 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1956); Holley v. Steamship Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 805
(E.D. Va. 1960). The latter decision contains an excellent and extensively annotated
discussion on the subject of recovery of costs and attorney fees in cases of indemnification for breach of warranty. See also Caswell v. K.N.S.M., N.V., 205 F. Supp. 295
(S.D. Tex. 1962); Serrano v. Fletes Maritimos S.A., 1962 Am. Mar. Cas. 1183 (D.P.R.
1962); Milea v. International Terminal Operating Co., 1962 Am. Mar. Cas. 674 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); Drago v. A/S Inger, 194 F. Supp. 438 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Cooper v. D/S A/S Progress,
188 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
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which the stevedore, after notice, failed to take the necessary steps
to avoid the injury. 109 The court specifically held against recovery
of attorney fees by the shipowner from the stevedore where neither
the shipowner nor the stevedore was liable because of a failure of
proof, though it was stated that recovery of fees in such a case
might be permissible if there was an express agreement to that
effect. Another decision refused such recovery to a shipowner
where there was a settlement between the injured longshoreman
and his stevedore-employer, and there was no showing of an express agreement by the stevedore to pay the shipowner's costs
and attorney fees nor a willingness on the part of the shipowner
to turn over the defense of the case to the stevedore.U0 The Second
Circuit very recently considered a situation wherein the stevedoreemployer settled with the injured longshoreman during the pendency of the trial, and allowed the shipowner-indemnitee to recover its litigation expenses from the stevedore-indemnitor, even
though the shipowner's pleading sought indemnity for sums that
might be "adjudged" against it, specifically making its ruling applicable to either an express or an implied indemnification provision.111 In order to follow the safest course and protect its interest
in regard to recovery of attorney fees and litigation expenses,
it would probably be advisable in indemnification cases for the
shipowner to tender defense to the stevedore and, whenever possible, to implead the stevedore in the longshoreman's case against
the shipowner. The failure to bring in the stevedore when service
could have been made upon it has been held in one case to preclude subsequent action by the shipowner against the stevedoreemployer for indemnification.112
G. Indemnification of Stevedore by Longshoreman Prohibited
In actions involving these matters, some authority holds that
the stevedore-employer cannot counterclaim or file a cross-complaint or cross-libel against the longshoreman-employee,113 though
109 Cimino v. United States, 1960 Am. Mar. Gas. 2120 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See also
DeGioia v. United States Lines Co., supra note 108; Hill v. American President Lines,
194 F. Supp. 885 (E.D. Va. 1961).
110 Deans v. Kihlstrom, 197 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Va. 1961).
111 Paliaga v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 301 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1962).
112 See note 74 supra.
113 Cavelleri v. Isthmian Lines, 190 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See also Cook v.
The M/S Wasaborg, 189 F. Supp. 464 (D. Ore. 1960). The Cavelleri case was certified
for appeal but the Second Circuit refused to entertain the appeal. In Malfitano v.
King Line, Ltd., 198 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), Judge Moore declined to agree with
the decision of Judge Kaufman in Cavelleri. Since then Judge Feinberg has distin-
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this question has yet to be considered by the Supreme Court. The
obvious reason for this rule is that, if such were permitted, there
would then be established a never-ending circle of liability seemingly incapable of final resolution. It must be noted, however,
that contributory negligence on the part of the injured longshoreman will reduce his recovery and, consequently, the amount of the
indemnification from the stevedore to the shipowner, on a comparative negligence basis, in accordance with the percentage or
degree of his fault. 114

VII.

SUMMARY

Under the present state of the law in this field, which by the
very nature of its past could be the subject of substantial change
in the future, it is clear that an injured longshoreman, whose injuries are caused either directly or indirectly by the unseaworthiness of the vessel aboard which he is working at the time of his
injury, has a right to recover damages from the shipowner, reduced in proportion to his mm contributory negligence, if any.
The shipowner in turn may obtain complete indemnification from
the longshoreman's stevedore-employer, including even costs of
trial and actual attorney fees, if the unseaworthiness of the vessel
was caused either in whole or in part or was brought into play
by the stevedore's breach of its warranty to perform its service in
a competent and workmanlike manner. In effect such a breach
would be brought about by the negligence of the stevedoreemployer through its employees. Thus far, the only act on the
part of a shipowner which has been held to preclude such indemnification from the stevedore-employer of the injured longshoreman is failure on the part of the shipowner to correct or warn the
stevedore of a latent, or hidden, dangerous defect or condition
in the vessel or its appliances known to the shipowner. However,
even in such an instance it is probable that if the latent, dangerous
defect or condition becomes known to the stevedore and the stevedore nevertheless proceeds with its loading or unloading of the
vessel, this would be held to be a waiver of the shipowner's failure
to correct or warn, and, in the case of a subsequent injury to a
guished the two and followed Cavelleri in Johnson v. Partrederiet Brovigtank, 202 F.
Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
114 Massaro v. United States Lines Co., 1962 Am. Mar. Cas. 2168 (3d Cir. 1962);
Drago v. Inger, 194 F. Supp. 438 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Santomarco v. United States, 1959
Am. Mar. Cas. 1808 (E.D.N.Y. 1959), afj'd, 277 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
823 (1960).
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longshoreman-employee of the stevedore, the shipowner would
not be precluded from obtaining complete indemnification from
the stevedore-employer. There is a hint of authority for the proposition that breach of an express warranty in the stevedoring contract by the shipowner will preclude indemnification from the
stevedore-employer in case of injury to a longshoreman caused
thereby. This question has been decided only as to an express indemnification provision. Again, it is probable that the stevedore's
proceeding in the face of a known breach of express warranty by
the shipowner would be held to be a waiver by the stevedore of
the shipowner's breach.

VIII.

COMMENT

The brief but fluid history of recovery of damages for injuries
received by longshoremen in the course of their employment
aboard vessels on navigable waters has virtually completed its
circle. At first the injured longshoreman sought recovery of damages from his stevedore-employer. Because of the fact that most
longshoremen's injuries were caused by the negligent acts of their
co-workers and therefore were subject to the common-law fellow
servant doctrine, thought to be applicable to the maritime law,
which prohibited recovery in such cases, the injured longshoreman's remedy against his stevedore-employer proved ineffective.
Following the trend of the states in adopting compensation acts,
the longshoreman was given a supposedly exclusive and absolute
remedy-though limited in amount of recovery-against his stevedore-employer under the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers
Compensation Act. For a time it was thought that this statutory
remedy precluded any other recovery by the injured longshoreman. Then he was permitted by the courts to recover damages
from the shipowner for injuries received by reason of the shipowner's negligence or the unseaworthiness of the vessel aboard
which he was injured. A remedy on behalf of an injured worker
against a third party is provided for in virtually all compensation
acts and is specifically incorporated into the Longshoremen and
Harbor Workers Compensation Act. However, because of the
absolute and almost all-inclusive character of the unseaworthiness
doctrine, the shipowner was virtually placed in an insurer's position as to longshoremen. When this proved to be harsh and unjust, the shipowner was permitted to recover over against the longshoreman's negligent stevedore-employer for breach of either an
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implied or an express warranty of workmanlike service. Though
the underlying theory was somewhat fictitious, the necessity for
allowing indemnification was occasioned by the existence of the
ancient common-law rule against contribution between joint tortfeasors. The only thing left to complete the circle of liability
would be to grant the stevedore-employer a right of indemnification against the injured longshoreman. Of course, such is not the
law and is really unnecessary, because the injured longshoreman's
recovery can be reduced in the first instance in accordance with
the degree of his contributory negligence, if any is present.
Although the route was circuitous, the result was reached.
The stevedore now ultimately bears the risk in case of injury to
his longshoreman-employee unless the injury is caused solely by
the shipowner's negligence or an unseaworthy condition of the
vessel to which the stevedore cannot be connected in any way.
Certainly, both the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation Act itself and the reasons behind it have been nullified
to a great extent. While the injured longshoreman still has the
benefit of the rapid and assured recovery of statutorily-afforded
compensation during disability, his stevedore-employer no longer
has a limitation on his liability to offset its absolute character
under the act. The basis for the act has been undermined to
such an extent that its necessity and effectiveness are now questionable. This is the only major area within the compensation
insurance field where such a result has occurred, although minor
inroads appear to have been made in some jurisdictions even as
to workmen's compensation.115 Careful scrutiny reveals that there
are two basic reasons for this unique development: first, the absolute quality of the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness which
was extended to longshoremen, thereby placing the shipowner in
the position of an insurer, contrary to the best interests of the
shipping industry in this country, which is already in the throes
of economic and operational difficulties and is unable to assume
additional financial burdens; and second, the venerable commonlaw rule against contribution between joint tortfeasors. Many
states have done away with the latter by statute, and in the admiralty and maritime law field the judicially-devised rule of divided damages has been applicable to collision cases for many
115 See Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 849, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954); Annot., 43
A.L.R.2d 865 (1954), and cases cited therein. See also Bowman v. Atlanta Baggage &
Cab Co., 173 F. Supp. 282 (N.D. Fla. 1959).
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years. The presence and applicability of both the unseaworthiness
and joint tortfeasor doctrines has resulted in injustice to first the
shipowner and then the stevedore by virtue of the placement of
full liability on the one or the other, regardless of their respective
degrees of fault. Since the substantive maritime law is composed
largely of federal legislative enactments and judicial pronouncements made over the years by the federal courts, it is to be expected that in the not too distant future liability may well be
reapportioned between the injured longshoreman, the shipowner
and the stevedore on some sort of a comparative responsibility
basis, either by federal legislation or by further judicial interpretation of the applicable substantive law.116
116 The initial trend is seemingly to avoid application of the warranty of workmanlike service in difficult cases by holding that whatever caused the injury to the longshoreman did not cause the vessel to be unseaworthy. The effect of this is to free
the innocent shipowner and limit the injured longshoreman's recovery and the stevedoreemployer's liability to that prescribed by the Longshoremen and Harbor ·workers Compensation Act. Such was the result in all of the cases cited in note 57 supra. 'While
this would appear to set the law back sixteen or more years, the result in particular
cases is probably the least unsatisfactory. The ultimate solution will still probably be
realistic apportionment between the three principals involved.

